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Abstract
We study the existence of pure Nash equilibrium (PNE)
for the mechanisms used in Internet services (e.g., on-
line reviews and question-answer websites) to incen-
tivize users to generate high-quality content. Most ex-
isting work assumes that users are homogeneous and
have the same ability. However, real-world users are
heterogeneous and their abilities can be very different
from each other due to their diverse background, cul-
ture, and profession. In this work, we consider heteroge-
neous users with the following framework: (1) the users
are heterogeneous and each of them has a private type
indicating the best quality of the content she can gener-
ate; (2) there is a fixed amount of reward to allocate to
the participated users. Under this framework, we study
the existence of pure Nash equilibrium of several mech-
anisms composed by different allocation rules, action
spaces, and information settings. We prove the existence
of PNE for some mechanisms and the non-existence of
PNE for some mechanisms. We also discuss how to find
a PNE for those mechanisms with PNE either through a
constructive way or a search algorithm.
Introduction
More and more Internet websites rely on users’ contribu-
tion to collect high-quality content, including knowledge-
sharing services (e.g., Yahoo! Answers and Quora) , online
product commenting and rating services (e.g., Yelp, mobile
app stores), and ecommerce websites (e.g., Amazon.com).
For simplicity, we call websites that rely on User-Generated
Content UGC websites. To attract more users and to incen-
tivize them to contribute high-quality content, those sites
usually give high-quality contributors some reward in the
form of virtual value, which represents privilege and bene-
fit, or monetary return, such as the gift card. To collect more
reward, users usually strategically interact with those web-
sites. Therefore, to maximize the quality of the content gen-
erated from users, a UGC website needs to carefully design
their mechanisms and analyze users’ behaviors. We call the
mechanisms used by those UGC sites UGC mechanisms.
Recently, much effort has been devoted to the design and
analysis of UGC mechanisms (Ghosh and Hummel 2011;
Ghosh and McAfee 2011; Easley and Ghosh 2013). Most of
those works assume that users are homogeneous - people
are of the same ability while contributing to the sites. How-
ever, in the real world, users’ abilities can be very differ-
ent from each other due to their diverse background, cul-
ture, and profession. For example, an experienced photogra-
pher can write a high-quality comment to a photo, which
is very difficult for a non-experienced user. Thus, in this
work, we study the game theoretical problem raised in In-
ternet services with heterogeneous users. We introduce the
concept of “type” for the problem, which denotes the abil-
ity of a user: the larger the type of a user is, the better
content she can contribute to the site. We further assume
that each user needs to afford a cost to participate in the
game and contribute content. The cost reflects the effort
of content generation (e.g. writing a review), such as time
and mobile traffic. In our work, we assume users costs are
bounded which is different from (Easley and Ghosh 2013;
Ghosh and McAfee 2011). We believe that our setting is
more practical because nobody would spend too much (if
not infinite) effort to make contributions.
Two allocation rules are studied in our work: one is
the top K allocation rule(Jain, Chen, and Parkes 2009;
Easley and Ghosh 2013) in which users with the highest
K qualities will get the reward equally. The other rule
is proportional-share rule(Ghosh and McAfee 2011;
Jain, Chen, and Parkes 2009; Nisan et al. 2007;
Chen 2009), in which all the participants (who make
non-zero contribution) will share the reward proportionally
to their contributed qualities. The proportional share rule is
also widely used in network rate control(Kelly 1997;
Kelly, Maulloo, and Tan 1998), market alloca-
tion(Cachon and Lariviere 1999) and schedul-
ing(Sandholm and Lai 2010; Stoica et al. 1996). Two
action spaces are investigated: the binary action space, in
which each user can only choose to participate in or not;
and the continuous action space, in which each user can
choose the quality of the content to contribute. Besides, we
study the problem from both the full-information setting
and the partial-information setting.
We study the existence of pure Nash equilibrium for sev-
eral different UGC mechanisms by combining the above op-
tions. Our main results can be summarized as follows.
1. For the full-information setting, we prove the existence of
PNE for the mechanism with the proportional allocation
rule and the continuous action space. The key of the proof
is to construct a perturbed game, prove the existence of
PNE for the perturbed game, and prove that the PNE of
the perturbed game will converge to the equilibrium of
the original game. We then discover several properties of
the PNE of the mechanism, which are further used to de-
sign an algorithm to find a PNE for the mechanism. We
also study three other mechanisms and show (1) the exis-
tence of PNE for the mechanism with the topK allocation
rule and the binary action space and for the mechanism
with the proportional allocation rule and the binary action
space and (2) the non-existence of PNE for the mecha-
nism with the top K allocation rule and the continuous
action space.
2. For the partial-information setting, we prove the exis-
tence of a symmetric PNE for the mechanism with the top
K allocation rule and the continuous action space. The
key of the proof is to construct a simple but (maybe) infea-
sible symmetric strategy and then convert it to a feasible
symmetric equilibrium strategy by repeated calibration.
Our proof also provides a method to construct a symmet-
ric PNE. For the binary action space, we prove the exis-
tence of equilibrium for the mechanisms with both top K
allocation rule and proportional allocation rule.
Related work
Recently UGC mechanisms have attracted
much research attention (Anderson et al. 2013;
Chawla, Hartline, and Sivan 2012;
Ghosh and McAfee 2011; Ghosh and Hummel 2011;
Ghosh and Kleinberg 2013). Most of the existing work
concentrates on homogeneous settings, i.e. users are of
the same ability to generate content for the website.
(Ghosh and McAfee 2011) designs a simple voting rule
under sequential and simultaneous model, in which both
the quality of contributions and the number of contributors
are endogenously determined. (Ghosh and Hummel 2011)
studies the rank based allocation mechanism for websites
with user-generated content and shows the mechanism
always incentivizes higher quality equilibriums than the
proportional allocation rule. (Ghosh and Kleinberg 2013)
models the online education forums with two parameters
which represent the frequency of checking forums by
teachers and students separately. A brief survey about UGC
mechanisms can be found in (Ghosh 2012).
The key differences between those existing literature and
our work are that (1) we focus on heterogeneous users who
have different abilities to generate content, and (2) we as-
sume users’ effort is bounded, i.e., users cannot afford an in-
finity cost to make contributions. One closely related work
is (Easley and Ghosh 2013), which studies the problem of
badge design. Although users’ abilities are considered in that
work, the participants are modeled as a continuum and as a
result, the single user’s behavior will not affect others’ pay-
off much. In this work, we regard users as discrete individu-
als, and one’s strategy will impact others’ utilities.
Model
In this section, we describe the model for analyzing the in-
centives created by various UGC mechanisms, when con-
tributors are strategic agents with heterogeneous abilities,
and when the decision of whether to participate in and how
much to contribute is a strategic choice.
There is a set of N strategic users in a UGC site, and
each user i has a private type qi ∈ [0, 1], which indicates the
best quality of the content the user can contribute to the site.
Without loss of generality, we number the users according
to the descending order of their types, i.e. q1 ≥ q2 . . . ≥
qN . Let xi denote user i’s action, which indicates the quality
of the content she actually contributes to the site. Note that
we have 0 ≤ xi ≤ qi. The user needs to afford a cost ci
for the action xi. In this work, we consider linear cost for
simplicity: ci = cxiqi , where c is a same upper bound
1 of the
cost that a user can afford.
We study two action spaces in this work. The first one
is a binary action space: each user can only choose not to
contribute or to contribute content with quality qi (i.e, xi ∈
{0, qi}). The second one is a continuous action space: the
quality xi that user i contributes to the site is a continuous
value between 0 and qi (i.e., xi ∈ [0, qi]). Note sometimes
we say that a user does not participate in the game if xi = 0,
and a user participates in the game if xi > 0.
The site has a fixed number of reward R to allo-
cate to the contributors, depending on their contribu-
tions. We study two allocation rules: the top K allocation
(Jain, Chen, and Parkes 2009) and the proportional alloca-
tion (Ghosh and McAfee 2011). The first one allocates R
K
to each user of those who contribute the top K largest qual-
ities. Note that if N < K , each user can still only get R
K
reward. The second one allocates the reward to all users pro-
portional to their contributions: the reward ri allocated to
user i is xi∑
j
xj
R if xi > 0 and 0 if xi = 0.
While analyzing the model, we consider two settings: the
full-information setting and the partial-information setting.
In the full-information setting, the types {qi}i∈[N ] are de-
terministic and are known to all the users. In the partial-
information setting, the type of each user is assumed to be
drawn from a publicly known distribution F , the first order
derivative of which is continuous, and each user only knows
her own type qi.
With the above notations, the utility of user i can be writ-
ten as ui(xi, x−i) = ri(xi, x−i)− ci(xi), where r(xi, x−i)
is the reward of user i given her strategy xi and the strate-
gies x−i of other players. We assume that all the users are
rational and they want to maximize their (expected) utilities.
Full-information Setting
In this section, we study the mechanisms under the full-
information setting. Recall that in this setting, the type qi of
any user is known to all the users. This setting corresponds
to the real-world scenarios where the users are familiar with
1If each user has a different cost upper bound Ci, it is easy to
absorb Ci into the private type qi by scaling: qi = qicCi .
each other. For example, considering a professional math-
ematical question posted in Yahoo! Answer, there will be
only a few users in the Yahoo! Answer community who can
answer the question and they know each other quite well.
Combining the different choices of the allocation rule and
the action space, there are four mechanisms under this set-
ting. We focus on the mechanism with the proportional allo-
cation rule and the continuous action space here and directly
list the results of the other three, which are relatively easy to
analyze.
M1: Top K Allocation, Binary Action Space
It is not difficult to see that PNE exists and is unique (except
the case R = Kc) for this scheme. There are three cases
depending on the parameters (R,K, c):
1. If R < Kc, no user will contribute content to the site and
the equilibrium is xi = 0, ∀i.
2. If R = Kc, there are many equilibria: any group of k ≤
K users contributing to the site is an equilibrium.
3. if R > Kc, the first K users will contribute to the site.
That is, xi = qi, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ K and xi = 0, ∀i > K .
M2: Top K Allocation, Continuous Action Space
There does not exist PNE for this mechanism under the full-
information setting according to the following discussions.
1. Zero-participating and more than K people participating
in are obviously not an equilibrium.
2. If the equilibrium is constructed by fewer than K people
participating in, there is at least one person would could
get positive utility by making a positive contribution. This
contradicts with the concept of equilibrium.
3. If there are K people participating in, all the contributors
will generate contents with quality ǫ → 0 but ǫ 6= 0, so
the equilibrium strategy does not exist.
M3: Proportional Allocation, Binary Action Space
It turns out that PNE exists and there can be multiple equi-
libria for this mechanism.
1. If R < c, there exists a unique equilibrium in which no-
body will contribute: xi = 0, ∀i.
2. If R = c, multiple equilibria exist: (1) nobody contribut-
ing is an equilibrium, and (2) any single user contributing
is also an equilibrium.
3. If R > c, Nash equilibrium exists. Denote j as the index
satisfying the following two inequalities:
Rqj∑j
k=1 qk
> c,
and
Rqj+1∑j+1
k=1 qk
≤ c.
Then xi = qi, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ j and xi = 0, ∀i > j compose an
equilibrium. There can exist multiple equilibria. Consider
an example with parameters N = 3, R = 4, c = 1, q =
{0.9247, 0.3421, 0.3095}. One can verify that both x =
{0.9247, 0.3421, 0} and x = {0.9247, 0, 0.3095} are
both equilibria.
M4: Proportional Allocation, Continuous Action
Space
We first prove the existence of PNE and then present an al-
gorithm to search the PNE for the mechanismM4.
Theorem 1 For the full-information setting, there exists a
PNE for the mechanismM4.
Proof. Consider an action profile {xi}i∈[N ]. Denote x−i =∑
j 6=i xj . If
∑N
i=1 xi > 0, the utility of user i is
ui(xi, x−i) = R
xi
xi + x−i
−
xi
qi
c, (1)
constrained by 0 ≤ xi ≤ qi.
The first order derivative of ui w.r.t xi is
∂ui
∂xi
= R
x−i
(xi + x−i)2
−
c
qi
. (2)
By setting the above derivative to zero, we get the best re-
sponse strategy of user i:
xi(qi, x−i) =
√
Rqix−i
c
− x−i. (3)
We have the following observations for this best response
strategy:
1. Clearly xi = 0 is not the best response when x−i = 0
because user i would not be rewarded with xi = 0. Actu-
ally there is not a best response for user i when x−i = 0:
if she gets a positive utility by contributing δ > 0, she
will profitably deviate by contributing δ2 . Therefore zero-
contribution (xi = 0, ∀i) is not an equilibrium strategy
but it is a fixed point for Eqn. (3).
2. xi calculated from Eqn. (3) can be smaller than zero
or larger than qi, which is not a feasible action. If
xi(qi, x−i) < 0, it means that Eqn. (2) will be smaller
than zero when xi > 0, so it is better to make zero contri-
bution. If xi(qi, x−i) ≥ qi, Eqn. (2) will be larger than 0,
so ui(xi, x−i) increases w.r.t. xi. Therefore it is better to
contribute qi.
Based on the two observations, we consider a perturbed
game (Feldman, Lai, and Li 2009), in which the action of
each user is lower bounded by a small positive quality ǫ and
the best response strategy of i is as below.
x∗i (qi, x−i, ǫ) =


ǫ if xi(qi, x−i) ≤ ǫ
xi(qi, x−i) if ǫ < xi(qi, x−i) < qi
qi if xi(qi, x−i) ≥ qi
(4)
where xi(., .) is defined in Eqn. (3). In the remaining part
of the proof, we show that (1) there exists a PNE for the
perturbed game; (2) as ǫ → 0, any PNE of the perturbed
game will not converge to zero contribution point and (3) by
setting ǫ→ 0, we get the PNE for the original game.
Denote the space [0, q1]×[0, q2]×...×[0, qN ] asX , which
is convex and compact. Define a mapping f fromX to itself,
in which for any fixed ǫ, ∀i ∈ [N ], fi(x, ǫ) = x∗i (qi, x−i, ǫ).
It is easy to verify that f is a continuous mapping. According
to Brouwer fixed-point theorem(Border 1989), we know f
has at least one fixed-point in X , which is the equilibrium of
the perturbed game. Denote one fixed point as2 xǫ. Since X
is compact, we could always find a series of {ǫn} → 0 with
their corresponding xǫn converging. Denote the limit point
as x0.
Next we show x0 is not the zero contribution point. Other-
wise,
∑N
i=1 x
ǫn
i could be infinitely close to zero as n→∞.
What’s more, both xǫn1 and x
ǫn
2 are strictly less than the
q1 and q2 respectively. We set
∑N
i=3 x
ǫn
i = δn and Q =
c
q1
+ c
q2
. By Eqn. (3) we obtain:√
Rq1(δn + x
ǫn
2 )
c
− (δn + x
ǫn
2 ) = x
ǫn
1√
Rq2(δn + x
ǫn
1 )
c
− (δn + x
ǫn
1 ) = x
ǫn
2 .
(5)
Add up the two equations in Eqn. (5) and solve it, the posi-
tive root is
x
ǫn
1 + x
ǫn
2 =
1
2
(R
Q
+
√
(
R
Q
)2 + 4δn
R
Q
)
− δn, (6)
which will not tend to zero as n → ∞. This contradicts
with the assumption that
∑N
i=1 x
ǫn
i could be infinitely close
to zero as n→∞.
Finally we prove x0 is the equilibrium strategy of the
original game by contradiction. Three possible alternative
cases need discussing. They are: user j would like to deviate
from
• x0j = 0 to x
′
j > 0;
• x0j ∈ (0, qj) to some x
′
j in [0, qj]− {x0j};
• x0j = qj to x
′
j < qj .
We just discuss the first case here. Similar method could
be applied to prove other cases and we put them in the ap-
pendix. Suppose user j could profitably deviate by contribut-
ing a content with quality no less than δ(> 0). Then we ob-
tain √
Rqjx0
−j
c
− x0
−j ≥ δ. (7)
Since x0j = 0,we know given any sufficiently small positive
ǫ, ∃N
′
, ∀n > N
′
, xǫnj < ǫ, i.e.,√
Rqjx
ǫn
−j
c
− xǫn
−j < ǫ. (8)
x
ǫn → x0 implies xǫn−j → x0−j . But as ǫ→ 0, we can verify
xǫn−j will not converge to x0−j by Eqn. (7) and Eqn. (8). This
contradicts with xǫn → x0. Details could be found in the
appendix.
Therefore, there exists a PNE for the mechanismM4.
Given the existence of PNE, we can obtain the following
lemmas about the properties of an equilibrium profile, which
will be used to find a PNE strategy. The proofs of the first
two lemmas can be found in Appendix.
2We denote vectors with bold face letters in this paper.
Lemma 2 Consider two users with qi ≤ qj . If xi = qi holds
in an equilibrium, then xj = qj holds in the same equilib-
rium.
Given MechanismM4, in which N users compete for the
reward R, we can induce a local game with m users: only
the first m users compete for the reward R. As shown in the
following lemma, an equilibrium of the induced local game
can be connected to the equilibrium of the original game
(i.e., MechanismM4 with N users) under certain condition.
Lemma 3 If {xi}i∈[m] is an equilibrium of the induced lo-
cal game with the first m users and ∑mi=1 xi ≥ Rqm+1c ,
then {yi}i∈[N ], where yi = xi, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m and yi =
0, ∀m+1 ≤ i ≤ N , is an equilibrium of the original game.
Proof. If user j(≥ m + 1) deviates by contributing z > 0,
her utility is
uj =
Rz∑m
i=1 xi + z
−
z
qj
c < z(
R∑m
i=1 xi
−
c
qj
)
≤ z(
R∑m
i=1 xi
−
c
qm+1
)
=
cz
qm+1
∑m
i=1 xi
(
Rqm+1
c
−
m∑
i=1
xi) ≤ 0.
(9)
That is, user j(j ≥ m+1) cannot be better off by unilaterally
deviating. The original game is the same as the local game
for the first m users, and they will not deviate unilaterally.
Therefore {yi}i∈[N ] is an equilibrium of the original game.
Based on the previous lemmas, we propose Algorithm 1
to find a PNE for a local game induced from the original
game and verify whether it is a PNE of the original game by
Lemma. 3. Then we discuss how to find a PNE for mecha-
nismM4 using Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The algorithm to find a PNE of the original
game from an induced local game
Input: q = (q1, q2, . . . qn) where q1 ≥ q2 ≥ . . . ≥ qn;
Output: x(n) = (x(n)1 , x
(n)
2 , . . . , x
(n)
n )
1: Calculate the yni ∀i ∈ [n] with Eqn. (14). If none of the
yni is smaller than zero or larger than the corresponding
qi, x
(n) ← yn; verify whether it is a PNE of the original
game by Lemma. 3; if so, return x(n).
2: for m← 1 : n do
3: Calculate xnim ∀i ∈ {m + 1, ..., n} with Eqn. (18).
x
(n)
i ← qi ∀i ∈ {1, ...m}, x
(n)
i ← xnim ∀i ∈ {m+
1...n} if they are all feasible;
4: if x(n) is a local PNE(verified by Lemma.4) then
5: Verify whether x(n) is a PNE of the original game
and return it if so;
6: end if
7: end for
Lemma 4 In Algorithm 1, x(n) is a PNE of the local in-
duced game with n users if the following condition holds:
• If m < n,
Rq1
2c
(1−
√
1−
4c
R
) ≤
n∑
k=1
x
(n)
i ≤
Rqm
2c
(1 +
√
1−
4c
R
);
• If m = n,
R ≥
cQ2m
qi(Qm − qi)
∀i ∈ {1, m}.
Proof. If user i contributes her type in equilibrium, we
know the solution of√
Rqix−i
c
− x−i ≥ qi
is non-empty. And we can easily infer that R ≥ 4c is a nec-
essary condition for that. We temporarily denote
∑n
k=1 x
(n)
i
as x.
When m < n, x(n)j < qj holds ∀j ∈ {m + 1, ..., n}.
They could be regarded as the best response strategies with-
out constraints. If anyone of the top m users does not want
to change her strategy unilaterally, the following inequality
holds ∀i ∈ [m]:√
Rqi(x− qi)
c
− (x− qi) ≥ qi (10)
Eqn. (10) suggests that
Rqi
2c
(1−
√
1−
4c
R
) ≤ x ≤
Rqi
2c
(1 +
√
1−
4c
R
)∀i ∈ [m],
i.e.
Rq1
2c
(1−
√
1−
4c
R
) ≤ x ≤
Rqm
2c
(1 +
√
1−
4c
R
). (11)
When m = n, we know all of the n people contribute
their types. If nobody could profitably deviate unilaterally,
we obtain ∀i ∈ [m],√
Rqi(Qm − qi)
c
− (Qm − qi) ≥ qi, (12)
i.e.
R ≥
cQ2m
qi(Qm − qi)
∀i ∈ {1, m} (13)
The functions used in Algorithm 1 are listed from Eqn.
(14) to Eqn. (18) and their derivations are in the appendix.
yni =
R(n− 1)
c
∑n
k=1
1
qk
[1−
n− 1
qi
∑n
k=1
1
qk
] (14)
Qm =
m∑
i=1
qi (15)
Anm =
n∑
i=m+1
c
Rqi
∀n ≤ N,n ≥ m+ 1 (16)
snm =
(n−m− 1) +
√
(n−m− 1)2 + 4QmAnm
2Anm
(17)
xnim = snm −
c
Rqi
s2nm (18)
Theorem 5 Recursively calling Algorithm 1 from n = 2 to
N , it outputs a PNE of the original game.
Proof. By Theorem 1, the induced local game has a PNE.
Given an n ≤ N , if the algorithm stops at Step 1, then
x
(n) is a PNE of the original game.
If the algorithm does not stop at Step 1, given the top m
people contributing their types, Eqn. (18) could be seen as
the strategies that people m+1, ..., n do not want to deviate
if they are feasible. If the topm people do not want to deviate
neither, we find a PNE of the induced local game. Lemma 2
describes the structure of all the PNEs, and therefore Algo-
rithm 1 will traverse all the local PNEs of the induced game.
Further, we note that a PNE of the original game is also a
PNE of some induced local game. So the PNE of the origi-
nal game could certainly be found by Algorithm 1.
Partial-information Setting
In this section, we investigate the existence of pure
Nash equilibrium of UGC mechanisms under the partial-
information setting. We discuss three mechanisms here and
leave another one (because of its difficulty) to the future
work.
M5: Top K Allocation, Binary Action Space
For simplicity, we only consider the case that R > Kc and
omit the marginal case R ≤ Kc here.
Let function T (x) denote the probability that a user with
quality x is in one of the top K contributors. Clearly, if N −
K ≤ 0, we have T (x) = 1; when N −K ≥ 1, we have
T (x) =
K−1∑
j=0
(
N − 1
j
)
F (x)N−1−j(1− F (x))j . (19)
Intuitively, a user with higher quality and fewer competitors
is more likely to get the reward:
Lemma 6 T (x) is a non-decreasing function of x.
Proof. We only need to discuss the non-trivial case, i.e.N−
K ≥ 1.
∂T (x)
∂x
=f(x)
{
(N − 1)F (x)N−2 +
N−K∑
j=N−2
(
N − 1
j
)
[
jF (x)j−1(1− F (x))N−1−j
−(N − 1− j)F (x)j(1− F (x))N−2−j
]}
=(N − 1)f(x)
(
N − 2
K − 1
)
F (x)N−K−1(1− F (x))K−1
≥0
(20)
Thus T (x) is a non-decreasing function of x.
Then we can construct a symmetric cut-off equilibrium
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1991) forM5:
Theorem 7 Denote the unique root of the following equa-
tion as x∗.
R
K
T (x)− c = 0 (21)
∀i ∈ [N ], we have that
β(qi) =
{
qi if qi ≥ x∗
0 if qi < x∗ (22)
is an equilibrium strategy ofM5.
Proof. Following the strategy, if a user with type q(≥ x∗)
chooses to participate in the game, the probability that she
could get the reward is
P (q) =
N−K−1∑
n=0
(
N − 1
n
)
F (x∗)n
K−1∑
j=0
(
N − n− 1
j
)
(F (q)− F (x∗))N−1−n−j(1− F (q))j
+
N−1∑
n=N−K
(
N − 1
n
)
F (x∗)n(1− F (x∗))N−1−n.
(23)
If q > x∗, we have P (q) > cK
R
, and the user’s expected
utility if she participates in the game is
R
K
P (q)− c >
R
K
cK
R
− c = 0. (24)
If q ≤ x∗, the expected utility for the user is 0. Thus none
can be better off by deviating her strategy unilaterally.
M6: Top K Allocation, Continuous Action Space
We first give a general description to a symmetric equilib-
rium strategy, then prove the existence of PNE when F is
the uniform distribution with the method of (Krishna 2009),
and finally generalize the result to any general distribution.
Let us consider a symmetric strategy β(): each user i with
quality qi will contribute to the site with quality β(qi).
Lemma 8 If β() is an equilibrium strategy, then qi > 0 ⇒
β(qi) > 0.
Proof. First we declare that given β() is an equilibrium
strategy, if qi < qj and β(qi) > 0, then we have β(qj) > 0.
Otherwise, user j can take the action xj = β(qi)+δ, where δ
is sufficiently small, to get positive utility, which contradicts
with that β() is an equilibrium strategy.
Therefore, if there exists some q > 0 such that β(q) = 0,
then we have β(x) = 0∀x ∈ [0, q]. For any user whose type
falls in [0, q], if she contributes ǫ, then her expected utility is
R
K
N−1∑
n=N−K
(
N − 1
n
)
F (q)n(1−F (q))N−n−1−
ǫ
qi
c (25)
We can always find an ǫ small enough to ensure the equation
above is larger than 0. Therefore β(qi) is not an equilibrium,
which leads to a contradiction. Thus, there does not exist a
q > 0 such that β(q) = 0.
Suppose that users j 6= i follow the symmetric equilib-
rium strategy β(). If user i pretends that her type is x and
contributes β(x), her expected utility is
ui(x; qi) =
R
K
T (x)−
β(x)
qi
c. (26)
The first order derivative of ui is
∂ui(x; qi)
∂x
=
R
K
∂T (x)
∂x
−
cβ
′
(x)
qi
. (27)
If β(qi) is an equilibrium strategy for user i, her expected
utility should be maximized at x = qi. That is, we should
have
∂ui(x; qi)
∂x
|x=qi = 0.
Note that β(0) = 0. Solving the above equation, we get
β(x) =
R(N − 1)
cK
(
N − 2
K − 1
)∫ x
0
tF (t)N−K−1(1− F (t))K−1dF (t)
(28)
Then we have the following results.
Lemma 9 If β(x) ≤ x, ∀x ∈ [0, 1], then the function β() in
the above equation is an equilibrium strategy.
However, it is possible that β(x) expressed by Eqn. (28)
is larger than x. For example, if F is the uniform distribution
over [0, 1], β(x) can be written as below.
β(x) =
R
cK
(N−1)
(
N − 2
K − 1
)
K−1∑
k=0
(−1)K−k−1
(
K − 1
k
)
xN−k
N − k
(29)
Then we have3
β(1) =
∫ 1
0
Rx
cK
∂T (x)
∂x
dx
=
∫ 1
0
R
cK
(N − 1)
(
N − 2
K − 1
)∫ 1
0
x
N−K(1− x)K−1dx
=
R
cK
(N − 1)
(
N − 2
K − 1
)
B(N −K + 1, K)
=
R
cK
N −K
N
,
which might be larger than 1.
If β(x) > x for some x ∈ [0, 1], β(x) will not be an equi-
librium strategy anymore. We need to calibrate β(x). For
ease of description, we first illustrate how to make calibra-
tion when F is the uniform distribution, and then extend to
a general distribution.
With some derivations, one can get that the equation
β(x) = x has at most positive two solutions in the region
(0, 1] for uniform distribution F . If there exist two positive
solutions (denote them as x1 and x2, and assume x1 < x2),
there will be an xp(> x1) that satisfies β
′
(xp) = 1. Then
we have:
3B(, ) is the beta function.
Theorem 10 If F is the uniform distribution over [0, 1] and
β(x) = x has two solutions in (0, 1], the following β∗()
function is an equilibrium, where x1 and xp are defined
above.
β∗(x) =


β(x) x ∈ [0, x1]
x x ∈ (x1, xp]
β(x) − β(xp) + xp x ∈ (xp, 1]
(30)
Proof. First, if x ∈ [0, x1], since β(x) ≤ x, we have that
β∗(x) = β(x) is the best response of type x.
Second, it is clear that the first order derivative β′(x) is
larger than 1 for any x ∈ (x1, xp). Suppose that all the others
follow strategy β∗() except user i, and suppose she pretends
that her type is x.
• If x ∈ (x1, xp), we have
ui(x; qi) =
R
K
T (x)−
x
qi
c,
and
∂ui(x; qi)
∂x
>
R
K
∂T (x)
∂x
−
β
′
(x)
qi
c ≥
R
K
∂T (x)
∂x
−
β
′
(x)
x
c = 0.
Therefore, the larger x is, the larger utility she will get.
However, since the contributed quality is upper bounded
by her type qi, the best choice for her is to take the action
xi = qi.
• If x ∈ [0, x1], we have
∂ui(x; qi)
∂x
=
R
K
∂T (x)
∂x
−
β
′
(x)
qi
c >
R
K
∂T (x)
∂x
−
β
′
(x)
x
c = 0.
So she should pretend her type is x1, which is still worse
than revealing the true type qi.
Thus, for any x in (xi, xp], the best response is β∗(x) = x.
Third, note that for any x in (xp, 1], we have β
′
(x) ≤ 1.
Integrating β′(x) from xp to x and using β(xp) = xp, we
get
β∗(x)− xp = β(x) − β(xp).
It is easy to verify that β∗(x) ≤ x for any x in (xp, 1]. There-
fore, we get that β∗(x) = β(x) + xp − β(xp) is the best
response for any x in (xp, 1].
Thus, the theorem is proved.
Figure 1 shows an equilibrium strategy for N = 11,K =
5, c = 1, R = 8.
Next we generalize the above results. For a general distri-
bution F over [0, 1], we first initialize β∗(x) = β(x), ∀x ∈
[0, 1] and then calibrate β∗(x) as follows.
1. Check whether β∗(x) > x starting from x = 0 to x = 1.
2. Suppose [x1, x2] is the first interval that β∗(x) > x, and
xp is the point in this interval satisfying β
′∗(xp) = 1. Let
o denote the value of β∗(x) at xp (i.e., o = β∗(xp)), and
then calibrate β∗(x) = x, ∀x ∈ [x1, xp] and β∗(x) =
β∗(x)− o+ xp, ∀x ∈ (xp, 1].
3. Continue to check whether β∗(x) > x starting from x =
xp to x = 1. If there is still some interval with β∗(x) > x,
we calibrate β∗(x) as shown in Step 2.
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Figure 1: An example equilibrium strategy
4. We repeat the checking and calibrating procedure until
β∗(x) ≤ x, ∀x ∈ [0, 1].
After this calibration process, we obtain an equilibrium
strategy β∗(x) from β(x), which is shown in Eqn. (28), for
any distribution F . Therefore we have the following theo-
rem.
Theorem 11 M6 has at least one symmetric PNE.
M7: Proportional Allocation, Binary Action Space
Now we study the existence of PNE of the mechanism with
the proportional allocation rule and the binary action space
under the partial-information setting.
For user i, let us consider the following cut-off strategy:
βi(x) =
{
qi if x ≥ x∗
0 if x < x∗, (31)
where x∗ is a threshold parameter.
Suppose that users j 6= i follow the above strategy. Then
the expected utility of user i can be written as follows if she
participate in the game (xi = qi).
ui(qi;x
∗) =
N−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
F (x∗)N−1−k(1− F (x∗))kui(qi, k;x
∗)− c
def
= y(qi, x
∗)− c,
(32)
where ui(qi, k;x∗) is the expected utility of user i given
another k users with quality larger than x∗ participating in
the game, and it can be written as
R
∫ 1
x∗
...
∫ 1
x∗
qi
qi + t1 + t2 + . . .+ tk
dF (t1|x
∗)...dF (tk|x
∗).
In Eqn. (32), when k = 0, ui(qi, k;x∗) = R, which means
that user i gets all the reward R since no other user partici-
pate in the game (k = 0 means xj = 0, ∀j 6= i).
If Eqn. (31) is an equilibrium strategy, then the best re-
sponse of user i is also to follow the strategy given that all
other users follow the strategy. That is,
ui(qi;x
∗) =


> 0 if qi ≥ x∗
= 0 if qi = x∗
< 0 if x < x∗
(33)
It is not difficult to get that
• y(qi, x
∗) increases w.r.t. qi,
• y(0, 0)− c = −c < 0 and y(1, 1)− c = R− c > 0.
We further assume that F (.|.) is a continuous function; con-
sequently, y(t, t) is continuous. Therefore, there exists an x∗
satisfying the three conditions in Eqn. (33); in turn, this x∗
makes Eqn. (31) a (symmetric) equilibrium strategy. Thus
we have the following theorem.
Theorem 12 M7 has at least one PNE if R > c.
Conclusions and Future work
We studied UGC mechanisms under a new framework:
Users are heterogeneous and the best quality a user can con-
tribute can be different from others. Under the framework,
we considered several mechanisms involving two allocation
rules, two action spaces and two information settings. We
proved the existence of multiple PNE for some mechanisms,
the existence and uniqueness of PNE for some mechanisms,
and the non-existence of PNE for some other mechanisms.
There are many issues to explore about UGC mechanisms
in the future. First, the efficiency analysis is a meaning-
ful topic given the existence of multiple equilibria for some
mechanisms. Second, we plan to study the mixed Nash equi-
librium for UGC mechanisms. Third, we only considered
linear cost function in this work. We will investigate more
general cost functions (e.g., concave functions). Fourth, the
comparison between different mechanisms would be an in-
teresting topic.
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Appendix
Omitted Proofs
In this section, we give some technical details that are omit-
ted in the main paper.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose user i has a
larger type than user j (qi ≥ qj) and contributes xi < qi in
equilibrium.
Setting A =
∑
k 6=i,j xk, we have√
Rqi(A+ qj)
c
− (A+ qj) = xi (34)
and √
Rqj(A+ xi)
c
− (A+ xi) ≥ qj . (35)
From Eqn. (34) and Eqn. (35) we get
qj(A+ xi) ≥ qi(A+ qj). (36)
With some simple derivations we can see
(qj − qi)A ≥ qj(qi − xi). (37)
The left hand side of Eqn. (37) is smaller than zero but the
right hand side is larger than zero. It is a contradiction.
Derivation of Eqn. (14)
By summing Eqn. (2) over i, we get
xi + x−i =
R(N − 1)
c
∑N
k=1
1
qk
. (38)
Substituting the above equation to Eqn. (3), we obtain
xi =
R(N − 1)
c
∑N
k=1
1
qk
[1−
N − 1
qi
∑N
k=1
1
qk
], (39)
which is the best response without considering feasibility
constraints.
Derivation of Eqn. (18)
Consider the case that only the first n users participating in
the game and the first m users out of the n users contribute
their types. For user i ∈ {m + 1,m + 2...n}, Eqn. (2) can
be written as
R(Qm + y−i)
(Qm + yi + y−i)2
=
c
qi
∀i ∈ {m+ 1,m+ 2...n}.
(40)
Summing the above equation over i, we obtain
R
(n−m)(Qm + yi + y−i)−
∑n
i=m+1 yi
(Qm + yi + y−i)2
=
n∑
i=m+1
c
qi
.
(41)
Solving the above equation, we get
yi + y−i =
(n−m− 1)− 2QmAnm ±
√
(n−m− 1)2 + 4QmAnm
2Anm
.
We are only interested in the positive solution. Denoting
snm = Qm +
n∑
i=m+1
yi
=
(n−m− 1) +
√
(n−m− 1)2 + 4QmAnm
2Anm
,
(42)
we arrive at
yi = snm −
c
Rqi
s2nm. (43)
Omitted proof of Theorem 1
Define
l(δ, q) =
1
2
(
Rq
c
− 2δ −
√
(
Rq
c
)2 − 4δ
Rq
c
) (44)
and
u(δ, q) =
1
2
(
Rq
c
− 2δ +
√
(
Rq
c
)2 − 4δ
Rq
c
). (45)
We find that
l(δ, q) =
1
2
(
Rq
c
− 2δ −
√
(
Rq
c
)2 − 4δ
Rq
c
)
=
2δ2
Rq
c
− 2δ +
√
(Rq
c
)2 − 4δRq
c
.
(46)
So l(δ, q) monotonously increases with δ and u(δ, q)
monotonously decreases with δ.
If Eqn. (7) has no solution, we know that she will not
change her strategy to generate a content with quality larger
than δ. We only consider the case that Eqn. (7) is solvable.√
Rqjx0−j
c
− x0
−j ≥ δ ⇒ l(δ, qj) ≤ x
0
−j ≤ u(δ, qj)√
Rqjx
ǫn
−j
c
− xǫn
−j < ǫ⇒ x
ǫn
−j < l(ǫ, qj) or x
ǫn
−j > u(ǫ, q).
(47)
As ǫ→ 0, ∃δ1 > 0, δ2 > 0, s.t.
l(δ, qj)− l(ǫ, qj) ≥ δ1
u(ǫ, qj)− u(δ, qj) ≥ δ2,
(48)
which shows that xǫn−j does not converge to x0−j . It is con-
tradicted with xǫn → x0.
If 0 < x0j < qj , we know x
ǫn
−j will converge to l(x0j , qj)
or u(x0j , qj). If user j wants to deviate to
• some another x′j ∈ (0, qj) but x0j 6= x
′
j , we know x0−j =
l(x
′
j , qj) or x
0
−j = u(x
′
j , qj), which contradicts with the
fact that the series {xǫn} converges.
• x
′
j = qj , we obtain l(qj , qj) ≤ x0−j ≤ u(qj, qj). By the
monotonicity of l(, ) and u(, ) we can find a contradiction.
• x
′
j = 0, we obtain x0−j ≤ l(0, qj) or x0−j ≥ u(0, qj).
Neither l(x0j , qj) nor u(x0j , qj) could fall in those regions.
If x0j = qj but she wants to deviate to some δ
′
≤ δ < qj ,
we know x0−j ≤ l(δ, qj) or x0−j ≥ u(δ, qj). While x0j =
qj suggests that xǫn−j will converge to a point in the region
l(qi, qi) ≤ x
0
−j ≤ u(qi, qi), so we find a contradiction.
